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Accordingly, in Lane v. Nation-
wide Mut. Ins. Co., the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland expressly 
overruled Yingling v. Phillips, and 
held that when the insured party 
seeks to recover benefits from his 
automobile liability insurance car-
rier (even if he has already timely 
exercised his option to try to recover 
damages in tort, having notified the 
insurer of such an intent), the suit 
against the insurer was governed by 
traditional contract principles. As 
such, the three-year statute of limi-
tations did not begin to run against 
the insured until the insurer breached 
the contract by denying coverage of 
the claim. Such a holding enables 
an insured motorist to wait until the 
carrier actually denies coverage be-
fore filing a contract suit. By plac-
ing the burden on the insurance car-
rier to make an affirmative denial, 
the insured no longer takes the risk 
that limitations might run merely 
because he or she was aware the 
other motorist was uninsured. 
- Jennifer K. Etheridge 
Minnick v. Mississippi: RIGHT 
TO COUNSEL DURING 
CUSTODIAL INTERROGA-
TION BARS POLICE INITI-
ATED DISCUSSIONS UNLESS 
COUNSEL IS PRESENT. 
In Minnickv. Mississippi, IllS. 
Ct. 486 (1990), the United States 
Supreme Court reversed the Missis-
sippi Supreme Court when it ruled 
that when a defendant in custody 
has requested counsel, officials may 
not reinitiate interrogation without 
counsel present. This holds true 
even if the accused has consulted 
with his attorney since making the 
request. 
Robert Minnick was arrested in 
1986 in California on a Mississippi 
warrant for capital murder. The 
next day, two FBI agents re-read 
him his Miranda rights. Although 
he acknowledged that he understood 
them, Minnick refused to sign a 
waiver of rights form. He agreed to 
continue the interview but said he 
would not answer"very many" ques-
tions. Id. at488. He then proceeded 
to answer a number of questions 
concerning his escape from a Mis-
sissippi jail and his subsequent flight. 
He concluded the interview by say-
ing, "[ c lome back Monday when I 
have a lawyer," and that he would 
make a more complete statement at 
that time. Id. at 488. By Monday, 
the accused had spoken with his 
lawyer two or three times and been 
told in no uncertain terms ''to talk to 
nobody." Id. at 493. 
On Monday morning, a deputy 
sheriff from Mississippi came to the 
California jail in order to question 
Minnick. Having been told by his 
jailers that he would "have to talk" 
to the deputy and that he "could not 
refuse," Minnick proceeded to con-
fess his part in several murders com-
mitted following his escape. Id. at 
488-89. Minnick confessed that he 
and fellow prisoner, James Dyess, 
broke into the victim's mobile home 
after escaping from a county jail in 
Mississippi. When the victim re-
turned home, he was killed by Dyess. 
Minnick was then handed a pistol 
and ordered at gunpoint to shoot the 
victim's friend. He did. 
The motion to suppress these 
statements, as given to the Missis-
sippi deputy, was denied. Minnick 
was convicted on two counts of 
capital murder and sentenced to 
death. On appeal, the Supreme Court 
of Mississippi upheld the trial court 
ruling that the defendant's Fifth 
Amendment right to counsel had 
been satisfied. The United States 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
examine whether the defendant's 
Fifth Amendment right to counsel 
had been terminated or merely sus-
pended by his previous consulta-
tions with counsel. 
Justice Kennedy began the analy-
sis by examining the language of 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 
(1966), where the Court held that 
police must terminate their interro-
gation of an accused in custody when 
the accused requests counsel. At 
that point, ''the individual must have 
an opportunity to confer with the 
attorney and to have him present 
during any subsequent questioning." 
Minnick, 111 S. Ct. at 489 (quoting 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474). Turning 
to Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 
477 (1981), the Court determined 
that having requested an attorney, 
an accused "is not subject to further 
interrogation by the authorities un-
til counsel has been made available 
to him, unless the accused himself 
initiates further interrogation by the 
authorities until counsel has been 
made available to him, unless the 
accused himself initiates further 
communication, exchanges, or con-
versations with the police." Id. at 
490 (citing Edwards, 451 U.S. at 
484-85). This legal precedent left 
open the possibility of a defendant 
impliedly asking for counsel at each 
and every new custodial interroga-
tion. The issue posed in Minnick, 
therefore, was whether the Edwards I 
requirement of counsel at custodial 
interrogations was satisfied after the 
suspect had consulted with an attor-
ney. 
In support of allowing 
uncounseled confessions, the Su-
preme Court of Mississippi had 
rested its holding on the theory that 
the Fifth Amendment requirement 
dissipated once the accused met with 
counsel and could only be reinstated 
by another request for counsel. 
Minnick, 111 S. Ct. at 490. The 
Supreme Court, however, refused 
to follow this proposition for three 
reasons. First, a holding that al-
lowed the Fifth Amendment rightto 
-------------------------- 22.1/fhe Law Forum - 39 
vanish when counsel was provided 
but not present would be inconsis-
tent with the Edwards and Miranda 
goals of providing counsel at all 
custodial interrogations. Id. at 491. 
Second, the proposed exception 
would undennine the benefits cre-
ated by the bright line test of Edwards 
and its progeny, causing the Edwards 
requirement to pass in and out of 
existence multiple times, and 
thereby, cause mass confusion. Id. 
at 491-92. Third, the detennination 
of what consultation is required 
would be a constant factual bone of 
contention. Id. at 492. 
On a policy level, the Court noted 
that "[ c ]onsultation is not a precise 
concept, forit may encompass varia-
tions from a telephone call to say 
that the attorney is in route, ... to a 
lengthy in-person conference." Id. 
The Court went on to say that offi-
cials would have to confinn these 
occurrences with the dangerous re-
sult that necessary inquiries could 
interfere with attorney-client privi-
leges. Id. Furthennore, the pro-
posed rule would penalize the 
prompt attorney who has counseled 
his client and reward the dilatory 
attorney whose client has not been 
counseled. Id. The Court was con-
cerned that acceptance of the pro-
posal would hinder judicial effi-
ciency and economy by distorting 
"the proper conception of the 
attorney's duty to the client." Id. 
Accordingly, the Court held "that 
when counsel is requested, interro-
gation must cease, and officials may 
not reinitiate interrogation without 
counsel present, whether or not the 
accused has consulted with his at-
torney." Id. 
In the final words ofthe majority 
opinion, Justice Kennedy noted that 
an accused can still waive his re-
quest for counsel if he initiates the 
conversation or discussion with the 
authorities.Id. However,anywaiver 
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argument in Minnick was negated 
by the fact that the confession was 
the product of a fonnal interview 
initiated by police which Minnick 
was compelled to attend. Id. 
In dissent, Justice Scalia pointed 
to the long-tenn ramifications of 
this decision. He wrote that the 
Minnick holding is "the latest stage 
of prophylaxis built upon prophy-
laxis, producing a veritable fairy-
land castle of imagined constitu-
tional restriction upon law enforce-
ment." Id. at 497. He went on to 
state that "[t]his newest tower ... is 
needed to avoid inconsisten[ cy] with 
[the] purpose of Edwards' prophy-
lactic rule ... which was needed to 
protect Miranda's prophylactic right 
to have counsel present, which was 
needed to protect the right against 
compelled self-discrimination found 
(at last!) in the Constitution." Id. 
(emphasis in original). 
Justice Scalia then looked to 
Miranda's "knowingly and intelli-
gently" waiver requirement forcoun-
sel which led to the Fifth Amend-
ment waiver standard found inJohn-
son v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). 
Minnick, 111 S. Ct. at 494. The 
Zerbst waiver, which detennined 
whether an abandonment of the right 
to counsel had occurred, depended 
on particular facts such as back-
ground, experience, and conduct of 
the accused. Id. (citing Johnson, 
304 U.S. at 464). Yet in Minnick, as 
pointed out by the dissent, the ma-
jority created an irrebuttable pre-
sumption that an accused can never 
waive the right to counsel in any 
police initiated encounter, even af-
ter consultation with his attorney. 
Minnick, 111 S. Ct. at492. Thiswas 
contrary to the clear language of 
Edwards, which mandated that the 
accused may initiate communica-
tion, and, thereby, waive his right to 
counsel. Further, this view was 
contrary to the express language of 
the majority opinion in Minnick. 
The dissent then turned to the 
State of Mississippi 's argument that 
the Fifth Amendment attorney re-
quirement should dissipate after the 
accused is counseled. Id. at 495. 
Unlike the majority, Justice Scalia 
proceeded to find that consultation 
is not difficultto defme, that prompt-
ness of the accused's attorney is 
irrelevant, and that once the accused 
is counseled, Edwards is no longer 
applicable. Justice Scalia then 
pointed to Watts v. Indiana, 338 
U.S. 49 (1949), in which the Court 
held that "any lawyer worth his salt 
will tell the suspect in no uncertain 
tenns to make no statement to the 
police under any circumstances." 
Minnick, 111 S. Ct. at 496 (quoting 
Watts, 338 U.S. at 59). In conclu-
sion, the dissent noted that if the 
accused is so foolish as to confess 
having spoken with counsel, "[ w]e 
should . . . rejoice at an honest 
confession, rather than pity the 'poor 
fool' who has made it." Id. at 498. 
In holding that an accused can-
not be interrogated even though he 
has consulted with his attorney, the 
Court clearly extended Edwards, 
and, thereby, further defined its 
bright line test. In the wake of 
Edwards, the Court has repeatedly 
held that the benefits of clear and 
specific rules regarding the Fifth 
Amendment attorney requirement 
outweighs the burden imposed on 
law enforcement agencies. How-
ever, by extending Edwards to this 
degree, the Court seems to sacrifice 
the benefit of serendipitous dimness 
in the name of brightness. 
- William P. Atkins 
